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Abstract in English 
We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to determine efficient discount rates for 
climate (mitigation and adaptation) and non-climate investment in the face of climate change. 
Our main result is that the non-diversifiable risk in the economy may be related to both shocks 
in aggregate wealth and shocks in global average temperature. Therefore, both aggregate wealth 
and global average temperature will carry a risk premium reflecting their contribution to the 
total amount of non-diversifiable risk. We characterize both climate and non-climate 
investments by means of a contingent claim and show that climate and non-climate investments 
will in general be discounted at different rates. We discuss the conditions under which the 
discount rates of climate investments will be lower than the discount rate of non-climate 
investments.  
 
Key words: discounting, adaptation, mitigation, climate change, risk premia, dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model 
 
JEL code: G12, H43, Q5, Q54 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Door gebruik te maken van een dynamisch stochastisch algemeen-evenwichtsmodel zijn we in 
staat om efficiënte discontovoeten te bepalen voor investeringen in adaptatie en mitigatie. Ons 
belangrijkste resultaat is dat het systematische risico in een economie die geconfronteerd wordt 
met klimaatverandering, bestaat uit twee componenten. De eerste component reflecteert het 
systematische risico verbonden aan (financieel) vermogen, de tweede het systematische risico 
verbonden aan klimaatverandering. Elke component kent zijn eigen risicopremie. Het gevolg 
hiervan is dat de discontovoet voor investeringen in adaptatie en mitigatie over het algemeen af 
zal wijken van de discontovoet voor ‘normale’ investeringen. We bespreken de condities 
waaronder investeringen in adaptatie en mitigatie met een lagere discontovoet gedisconteerd 
moeten worden. 
 
Steekwoorden: disconteren, adaptatie, mitigatie, klimaatverandering, risicopremie, dynamisch 
stochastisch algemeen-evenwichtsmodel 
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1  Introduction 
Suppose we are asked to value two investments which are equally risky in terms of aggregate 
wealth. The only difference between these investments is that the first one is a climate 
investment, i.e. an investment in mitigation or adaptation, whereas the second one is a non-
climate investment. Should we then require these investments to earn the same rate of return at 
each moment in time? That is, should we apply a uniform discount rate to value them?
1 A 
persuasive argument in favour of a uniform discount rate rests on the notion of the opportunity 
cost of capital and is at the heart of the logic of the descriptive approach to climate change.
2 
Arrow et al. (1996) describe the basic logic behind this approach as follows. Suppose that the 
rate of return on climate investments lies below the market return of non-climate investments. 
Total welfare can then be improved by increasing the level of non-climate investments at the 
expense of climate investments until the difference in their respective rates of return is 
eliminated.  
 
Although the descriptive approach has been challenged by many inside and outside the 
economic profession for its use of market-based returns, the use of a uniform discount rate for 
climate and non-climate investments has, perhaps surprisingly, hardly received any criticism.
3 
For example, proponents of the prescriptive approach on climate change, like Cline (1992) and 
Stern (2007, 2008), have argued on ethical grounds that market interest rates should not be used 
as a benchmark for the social discount rate (SDR). However, they never challenged the idea that 
the discount rate should be uniform. This has made the prescriptive approach vulnerable to the 
counterargument that a low SDR would lead to very high saving rates (see f.e. Nordhaus (2007) 
and Dasgupta (2008)). Another strand of literature has questioned the tendency of the 
descriptive approach to extrapolate the level of the current market interest rate (indefinitely) 
into the future, but not the idea that the discount rate should be uniform. For example, 
Weitzman (1998) shows that uncertainty about the appropriate rate of return on capital in the 
far-distant future will lead to a declining discount rate (DDR) over time. Still, all investments 
should be discounted at a uniform rate because in his model the discount rate for any project 
depends solely on the time-horizon of the project’s benefits. 
 
Although (part of) the motivation for using either the SDR or DDR approach lies within risk 
associated with climate change,
4 neither of them has formally modelled environmental 
 
1 Note that discount rates for the time frames under consideration are in fact not observable. This does not, however, 
interfere with the issue under consideration in this paper: why use the same discount rate for climate and non-climate 
investments at each point in time? 
2 The term ‘descriptive approach’ is due to Arrow et al. (1996). The best-known proponent of the descriptive approach is 
Nordhaus (2008). 
3 Recently, Weitzman (2007) has suggested that that the beta of climate investments might actually be lower than the beta 
of non-climate investments.  
4 A low value of the SDR has been motivated partly by choosing a low value for the coefficient or relative risk aversion.   8 
uncertainty as the central feature of climate change while recognizing that (i) this environmental 
uncertainty is endogenous, i.e. it is generated by our own activities; and (ii) the environment 
may have an (uncertain) feedback on economic activity and welfare. In this paper, we develop a 
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that accounts for these drawbacks. In our model 
climate change is uncertain. It affects, and is affected by, economic activity and welfare. The 
model encompasses four ways in which climate change may affect welfare. First, climate 
change may affect welfare indirectly, by changing the marginal value of consumption. Second, 
climate change may affect welfare directly, by changing the amenity value.
5 Third, climate 
change may affect both the expected rate of return and the volatility of production. Fourth, 
climate change may lead to an increase or decrease in volatility of climate change itself. This 
allows us to study the relationship between the risk premium of an investment on the one hand 
and the presence of economic and environmental risk on the other hand. Our main results are 
twofold. First, we show that the discount rate for any investment can be written as a function of 
(i) the risk free rate; (ii) the risk premium with respect to wealth; and (iii) the risk premium with 
respect to temperature. Second, and this is our main result, we show that climate and non-
climate investments will in general be discounted by a different discount rate. It must be 
emphasized that our result is fully consistent with any argument on the opportunity cost of 
capital provided one recognizes that the opportunity cost of capital may be determined by both 
economic and environmental risk. 
 
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we present our model and derive 
expressions for the level of the risk-free interest rate and the equilibrium prices of risk. Section 
3 characterizes climate and non-climate investments in terms of contingent claims and shows 
that in general climate investments are discounted at a different rate than non-climate 
investments. In section 4, we discuss the results in terms of current knowledge on (the 
economics of) climate change. Section 5 concludes. 
 
5 That is, we use a bivariate utility function. Hoel and Sterner (2007) and Gollier (2008) analyze the effect of such a function 
on the risk free rate under certainty and uncertainty, respectively.   9 
2  The model 
We consider a simple general equilibrium model with two aggregate consumption goods. The 
first is produced consumption, denoted by  ( ) C t . The second is an aggregate environmental bad, 
like temperature, ( ) T t . The index t  denotes time. The representative consumer maximizes 
expected utility of these consumption goods over time: 
[ ( ), ( )]
t
o J E e U C t T t dt
δ ∞ − ≡ ∫   (2.1) 
where  (.) U  denotes the utility function of the representative consumer and δ is the utility 
discount rate. Utility is increasing in consumption,  0 C U > , decreasing in temperature,  0 T U <  
and concave in both consumption and temperature  , 0 CC TT U U < . Production of the aggregate 
consumption good is considered to take place in n  different sectors and is described by the 
following system of stochastic differential equations:
6 
( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) K K dK t I T t dt I G T t dw t α = +   (2.2) 
Here,  ( ) K t  is a vector of size n  representing invested capital in each of the n sectors,  K I is an 
nxn diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is the ith component of  ( ) K t  and  ( ) w t is an 
1 n+  dimensional Wiener process in 
1 n R
+ . Finally,  ( , ) T t α is a n dimensional vector and 
( , ) G T t is an  ( 1) n n × + matrix.  ( , ) T t α denotes the expected rates of return of these production 
processes, whereas  ( , ) ( , ) G T t G T t ′denotes the covariance matrix of the rates of return. Notice 
that (2.2) includes the case in which the n  production processes are a geometric Brownian 
motion. 
 
The environmental bad, temperature, evolves according to the following stochastic differential 
equation: 
( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ) ( ) dT t T t K t dt s T t t dw t θ γ′ ′ = +   (2.3) 
where γ  is a vector whose ith element is describing the pollution intensity of the ith sector and 
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) s T t t s T t t ′  is the variance of temperature. Here,  ( ( ), ) s T t t is a vector of dimension  1 n×  
and γ is of dimension  1 n× . The flow of pollution  ( ) K t γ′  is fully determined by size and 
distribution of the capital stock over the n  sectors. This implies that in each sector the ratio 
between capital and pollution is fixed. Pollution depends of the expected rate of return in the 
economy,  ( ) ( ) / K E dK t dt I α = . This follows from the observation that the flow of 
 
6 To facilitate interpretation we present the stochastic differential equation for sector i, where we have divided both sides by 
( ) i K t . This differential equation reads:   ( ) / ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) i i i i dK t K t T t dt g T t dw t α = + . Here,
i g is the ith row vector of G .   10 
pollution ( ) K K t I γ γ α ′ ′ = ɶ , where  i i i γ γ α = ɶ .
7 Pollution leads to an expected drift in 
temperature, which is co-determined by the current level of temperature, ( ) T t . Although 
equation (2.3) includes a broad range of stochastic processes for the evolution of temperature 
over time,
8 we do not defend the position that the impact of carbon dioxide on the stochastic 
process of temperature can be described anywhere along the lines of equation (2.3). All that is 
important for our purposes here is that the flow of pollution changes the drift of temperature and 
that this change is positive, i.e.  2 0 θ > . Moreover, it would be possible - albeit at the cost of 
greater complexity – to write down a more comprehensive model describing the interaction 




Equations (2.1)-(2.3) show that temperature may affect utility in three ways. First, it may affect 
utility directly. Higher temperatures lead to lower utility. Second, it may affect utility indirectly 
by changing the marginal value of consumption. Third, it may affect utility indirectly by both 
changing the expected rates of return, the volatility of production in each of the n  sectors as 
well as the volatility in temperature itself. 
 
In the model, abatement is represented by shifting investment in capital from dirty to clean(er) 
sectors. When abatement is costly we have: 
1 2 1 0 n n γ γ γ γ − = < < < ⋯  and   1 2 1 0 n n α α α α − < < < < < ⋯   (2.4) 
That is, sectors with lower pollution intensities, represented by a loweri , have a lower expected 
rate of return. Since all sectors produce the same aggregate consumption good, one may think 
of these sectors using different energy inputs. For example, in the case of two sectors, sector 1 
may use renewables having zero pollution and a low expected rate of return, , whereas sector 2 
may use coal for its production process having a high rate of pollution and a high expected rate 
of return. The use of a different energy source as input may – besides affecting the expected rate 
of return – also effect the variability and the covariance of the returns. Notice that under our 
assumptions it is possible that optimal investment is zero in some sectors. As in CIR (1985) we 
explicitly allow for this possibility. The covariance between unanticipated changes in  ( ) K t  and 
( ) T t  is given by s G ′ . For the moment we postpone the discussion of its sign and simply note 
that this covariance is allowed to be either positive, zero or negative depending on the sector. It 
may also change sign over time. 
 
 
7 Alternatively, pollution could be made dependent on the actual rate of return. We will discuss this case in section 4.  
8 Examples are (Geometric) Brownian motion as well as (Geometric) Mean Reversion (see e.g. Metcalf and Hasset, 1995). 
9 See for example Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) who model the movement of a k-dimensional vector of state variables.   11 
Individuals can lend and borrow at an endogenously determined interest rate r  and can invest 
in each of the n  production possibilities and one contingent claim. The value of this claim is 
governed by the following stochastic differential equation:  
( ) ( ) dF F dt Fh dw t β ζ ′ = − +   (2.5) 
and will depend in general on all variables necessary to describe the state of the economy. Here, 
Fβ  is the total mean return on the claim and ζ  is the payout received. Notice that it is not 
necessary to assume relation (2.5). It can be derived within the context of the model (see 
Appendix A). h is an  1 n+ dimensional vector. The variance of the rate of return on this claim is 
given by h h ′ .  
 
The representative individual allocates his wealth among the ( 1) n+  investment opportunities in 
the basis and the riskless opportunity, borrowing or lending.
10 His budget constraint is then 
described by 
( ) ( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( ) dW a r W b r W rW C dt W a G bh dw t α β ′ ′ ′ = − + − + − + +   (2.6) 
whereaW  and bW  denote the amount of wealth invested in each of the production processes 
and the contingent claim. Expected changes in wealth are determined by the excess return
11 on 
the production processes and the contingent claim plus the risk free return minus (the flow of) 
consumption. We want to maximize utility over consumption and the investment strategy. 





( , ) max ( , )
C a b
E dJ W T
J W T U C T
dt
δ
    = +  
   
  (2.7) 
where the maximum is subject to  0, 0 C a ≥ ≥ . Using (2.3) and (2.6) and the fact that in 
equilibrium invested capital must equal the share of wealth allocated to each sector, i.e. 
( ) ( ) K t aW t = , (2.7) can be written as: 
, ,




( , ) max { ( , ) ( )
( 2 )
( ) }
W T C a b
WW
WT TT
J W T U C T W W J J
W a GG a W a Ghb W bh hb J
Wa Gs Wbh s J s sJ
δ µ θ = + + +
′ ′ ′ ′ + + +
′ ′ ′ + +
  (2.8) 
 
10 The basis is defined as the set of production processes and contingent claims such that any other contingent claim can be 
written as a linear combination of the assets in the basis. See Merton (1977) for a complete description of this concept. 
11 The return in excess of the equilibrium interest rate. 
12 Throughout the paper we assume that the problem is well-defined, i.e.   0 W J > ,  0 T J < ,  0 TT J < ,  0 WW J <  and 
2 ( ) 0 WW TT WT J J J − > .   12 
where  ( ) ( ) / W W E dW dt µ =  and  ( ( ), ( )) T t K t θ θ γ′ = . For the value function subscripts denote 
derivatives with respect to the states W and T . Differentiating (2.8) with respect to the controls 
, C a en b gives the first order conditions
13 
( ) ( )











a W T WW WT
a
b W WW WT
U J
C
r WJ WJ GG a Ghb W J GsWJ
a
r WJ h G a h hb W J h sWJ
ψ
ψ





′ = − + + + + ≤
′ =
′ ′ ′ ′ = − + + + =
  (2.9) 
where  , , C a b ψ ψ ψ are defined implicitly and  2 θ  denotes the partial derivative of θ  with respect 
to its second argument, the flow of pollution. We follow CIR (1985) in defining an equilibrium 
as a set of stochastic processes ( , ; , ) r a C β  satisfying (2.9) and the market clearing conditions 
1 i a = ∑ and  0 b = . We now turn to the determination of the equilibrium values of r and  β . 
The equilibrium interest rate is given by
14 
2
var( ) cov( , ) ˆ ( , , ) ( )
WW WT T
W W W
J J J W W T
r W T t a
J J W J W
α θ γ
    − −     ′ = + − −        
       
.  (2.10) 
while the equilibrium expected excess rate of return on any contingent claim  F is given by 
( ) W W T T r F F F β ϕ ϕ − = +   (2.11) 
Here,  W ϕ  and  T ϕ  are the risk premia associated with the state variables wealth and 
temperature. These are given by 








    − −
= +    
   
  (2.12) 








    − −
= +    
   
  (2.13) 
Here, the risk premium  W ϕ  can be interpreted as the excess expected return on an asset whose 
value is always equal to W . To see this construct an asset whose value is always equal to W , 
i.e.  F W = . For such an asset, we have  1 W F = and  0 T F = . Hence, from (2.11) we have 
( ) W r F β ϕ − = . An identical interpretation holds for  T ϕ . Combining equations (2.11) with 
(2.12) and (2.13) gives 
( ) cov( , )/ W W r F J FJ β − = −   (2.14) 
 
13 We refer to CIR (1985) for the assumptions under which such an equilibrium exists. 
14 Proofs of equations (2.10) - (2.14) are given in Appendix B.    13 
The expected excess return on a contingent claim is equal to the negative of the covariance of 
its rate of return with the rate of change in the marginal utility of wealth. Individuals demand a 
higher rate of return on assets that tend to pay of more when marginal utility is lower. Hence, 
such securities will have a higher risk premium. Our results are similar to the results obtained 
by CIR (1985) with the exception of (2.10). It is the expected social return on assets, 
2 ˆ ( ) T W a J J α θ γ ′ + , not the expected private return,  ˆ aα ′ , that is relevant for the equilibrium 
interest rate in the social optimum. The damage caused by an increase in temperature as a result 
of an additional unit of pollution – measured in terms of the marginal utility of wealth – must be 
subtracted from the private return on markets in order to get the equilibrium interest rate in the 
social optimum. This is intuitive as the equilibrium interest rate measures the expected rate of 
change in the marginal utility of wealth which is equal to the expected social rate of return on 
wealth plus the covariance of the rate of return on wealth with the rate of change in the marginal 
utility of wealth.
15 Finally, in case  ( , ) ( ) U C T U C =  it is easy to show that the expression for the 
risk free rate in (2.10) simplifies to the extended Ramsey equation. Under certainty, it simplifies 
further to the Ramsey equation.
16 This implies that the discussion on discounting in the 
literature (see for example Stern (2007), Nordhaus (2007) and Dasgupta (2008) is in fact a 
discussion on the appropriate level of the risk free rate. 
 
Regarding the intuition behind the risk premia, first consider an asset whose value is perfectly 
correlated with wealth. Such an asset will command an excess expected return of  W ϕ . The 
payoff of this asset will be high (low), when wealth is high (low). Hence, it requires a positive 
risk premium, which is reflected by the first part of the RHS of (2.12). The sign of the effect of 
temperate on the risk premium for wealth depends on the signs of  WT J  and cov( , ) W T . If both 
are positive, the second part of (2.12) will be negative.  In that case, the payoff of the asset is 
high (low) when wealth and temperature are high (low) as the latter are positively correlated. 
Given that high (low) temperatures lead to a high (low) marginal value of wealth, the payoff of 
such an asset is high (low) when the marginal value of wealth is high (low). The intuition 
behind the risk premium for temperature which is displayed in (2.13) is similar. 
 
Before relating our results to the economic literature on global warming, we provide further 
intuition for the risk premia. To that effect we rewrite equations (2.12) and (2.13) as follows 
(see Appendix E):  





C W W T
U U
ϕ
    − −
= +    
   
  (2.15) 








    − −
= +    
   
  (2.16) 
 
15 For a proof, see appendix C. 
16 For a proof, see Appendix D.   14 
We are now ready to decompose the risk premia into a risk premium belonging to the level of 
consumption (‘the level effect’) and a risk premium belonging to the change in marginal utility 
(‘the utility effect’). Consider first an asset whose value is perfectly correlated with wealth. The 
risk premium corresponding to the level effect is equal to the product of coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion times the covariance of optimal consumption and wealth. This is a familiar result 
in the asset pricing literature, see f.e. Breeden  (1979). Notice that although temperature does no 
longer appear in ˆ cov( , ) C W  it is actually subsumed in it (see Appendix E for details). The risk 
premium corresponding to the utility effect is equal to the product of the relative change in the 
marginal utility of consumption times the covariance between wealth and temperature. To give 
an example of the utility effect, suppose that consumption and temperature are substitutes in the 
sense of Edgeworth-Pareto, i.e.  0 CT U <  and that wealth and temperature move together, i.e. 
cov( , ) 0 W T > . First, high (low) wealth implies a low (high) marginal value of wealth. Second, 
we have from the assumption that wealth and temperature are moving together that high (low) 
wealth will mean high (low) temperature. As consumption and temperature are substitutes high 
(low) temperature will entail low (high) marginal utility of consumption. Summarizing, we have 
that high (low) wealth means low (high) marginal utility not only because wealth is high, but 
also because consumption is valued less. The utility effect reinforces the level effect. This is 
reversed when consumption and temperature are complements. This is intuitive as when goods 
are substitutes the value of goods moving together is less compared to the case where they are 
complements. It is also reversed when wealth and temperature are moving in opposite 
directions. 
 
Next, we turn to risk premium for temperature. Consider an asset whose value is perfectly 
correlated with temperature. The risk premium corresponding to the level effect is equal to the 
product of coefficient of absolute risk aversion times the covariance of optimal consumption 
and temperature. Again notice that although wealth does no longer appear in  ˆ cov( , ) C T  it 
actually is subsumed in it (see Appendix E for details). The risk premium corresponding to the 
utility effect is equal to the product of the relative change in the marginal utility of consumption 
times the variance of temperature. To give an example of the utility effect: if consumption and 
temperature are substitutes in the sense of Edgeworth-Pareto, i.e.  0 CT U < , high (low) 
temperature will mean that the marginal utility of consumption is low (high). From the 
consumer’s point of view, valuing (the marginal unit of) existing consumption less is equivalent 
to having more consumption (which reduces the value of the marginal unit of consumption). 
Hence, whenever consumption and temperature are substitutes in consumption it is as if they 
tend to move together. This leads to a positive risk premium as the first part on the RHS of 
(2.18) shows. This conclusion is reversed when consumption and temperature are complements.   15 
3  Discounting climate investments 
The cost-benefit ratio of long-term projects like the prevention of climate change depends 
crucially on the choice of the discount rate. The Stern Review uses a discount rate of 1.4% per 
annum and concludes that “the benefits of strong, early action considerably outweigh the 
costs.”
17 In his most recent study, Nordhaus (2008) uses a discount rate of 5.5% for the first half 
century and 4% for the first century.
18 His conclusion is that “efficient emissions reductions 
[…] involve modest rates of emissions reductions in the near term, followed by sharp 
reductions in the medium and long terms.” That the choice of discount rate is for a large part 
‘responsible’ for the widely diverging conclusions of Stern and Nordhaus has been made 
plausible by Nordhaus when he recalculates the optimal policy using Stern’s discount rate. This 
Stern Review run of the DICE model produces results similar (in terms of the required carbon 
tax)  to the Stern Review.
19 So, the choice of the discount rate seems to be the crucial variable 
in judging whether or not early action is the efficient strategy in the face of climate change.  
 
The above argument hinges on the assumption that all investments in the economy – climate 
and non-climate investments
20 – (should) earn the same rate of return.
21 A lower required return 
on climate investments compared to non-climate investments would raise the level of climate 
investments without inducing inefficiencies. This possibility has been brought forward by 
Weitzman (2007) who has argued that the beta of climate investments might indeed be lower 
than the beta of non-climate investments. In order to frame this issue in terms of our model, we 
distinguish between non-climate investments, investments in adaptation and investments in 
mitigation and describe the benefits of these investments as contingent claims. These are 
denoted by the superscripts  , n a  en m  respectively.  Thus,  ( , )
a F W T denotes the value of the 
benefits of an investment in adaptation. The specification of the claim includes a full 
description all the benefits (payoffs) that may be received from that claim. These benefits may 
depend on the state variables aggregate wealth and temperature. In a similar way the contingent 
claims, ( , )
m F W T  and ( , )
n F W T , denote the value of the benefits of an investment in mitigation 
and the value of a non-climate investment respectively.
22 Using (2.11), we have that the 
difference in the equilibrium expected rate of return between a climate investment, either 
adaptation or mitigation, and non-climate investments is given by  
 
17 Stern Review, Executive summary, page vi, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Summary_of_Conclusions.pdf. 
18 “With this pair of assumptions, the real return on capital around 5 ½ percent per year for the first half century of the 
projections, and this is our estimate of the return on capital.” (p. 61) and “The estimated discount rate in the model averages 
4 percent per year over the next century”  (p. 10)  
19 Similar conclusions have been drawn by Hope (2006a) and Mityakov (2007). 
20 We use the term non-climate investments to denote all investments except climate investments. 
21 Nordhaus is aware of this argument: “the discussion here assumes that climatic investments share the risk properties of 
other capital investments.” (Nordhaus 2008, p. 217, footnote 18).  
22 Here, we have used the fact that the expected rate of return of contingent claims not in the basis are uniquely determined 
by the equilibrium expected rate of return of those in the basis. CIR (1985, p. 374) show that equation (2.11) holds for all 
claims, basis and non-basis.   16 
( ) ( ) ( ), , .
i n i n i n
i n W W T T T T
W T T i n i n i n
F F F F F F
i a m
F F F F F F
β β φ φ φ − = − + − = − =    (3.1) 
where we have assumed that all investments have equal risk characteristics in terms of wealth.
23 
Equation (3.1) shows that the difference in the equilibrium expected rate of return between 
climate and non-climate investments is given by  ( / / )
i i n n
T T T F F F F φ − , the product of the risk 
premium with respect to temperature and the difference of the percentage change in the value of 
the contingent claims with respect to temperature. For non-climate investments and high 
enough temperatures, this partial derivative will be negative: an increase in temperature will 
decrease the value of a non-climate investment, i.e.  0
n
T F < . Notice that this is simply a 
restatement of the fact that climate change will damage the economy, that is 0 T J < . We 
recognize that some sectors in some countries might actually benefit from a modest rise in 
temperature (see f.e. Tol (2008)), but focus on the more long-term and more interesting  case in 
which higher temperatures result in damages. As the benefits of mitigation and adaptation are 
equal to the avoided damages, we have  , 0
a m
T T F F > . A rise in temperature increases the value of 
a climate investment (see also Stern, 2007, Ch. 18). Hence, we have that climate investments 
can be seen as a hedge for non-climate investments with respect to changes in temperature. 
However, as climate investments may be risky with respect to wealth, they are not necessarily a 
hedge with respect to changes in wealth. 
 
We are now finally in the position to write down the major contributions of the paper. The 
following proposition specifies sufficient and necessary conditions for climate investments to 
have a lower, equal or higher expected equilibrium rate of return than non-climate investments. 
 
Proposition 1 Given equal risk characteristics in terms of wealth, the difference in the 
equilibrium expected rate of return between climate and non-climate investments given by (3.1) 
is determined by the sign of the risk premium with respect to temperature,  T φ .  
 
The proposition follows immediately from (3.1) and the fact that  , , 0
m a n F F F >  and 
, 0, 0
m a n
T T T F F F > < . Proposition 1 allows us to make two observations. First, climate and non-
climate investments must in general be discounted at a different rate. Only in the special case 
where  , :cov( , ) var( ) W T WW WT W T J T J ∀ = −  , we have that  0 T φ = . Second, in any model without 
environmental risk,
24 i.e.  var( ) 0 T = , climate and non-climate investment must be discounted at 
the same rate of return given that they have similar risk characteristics in terms of terms of 
 
23 Of course, the risk premia of two investments may differ because the investments have different risk characteristics in 
terms of wealth. As the focus of this paper is on different risk characteristics in terms of temperature, we will assume 
throughout this section that the risk characteristics in terms of wealth are equal.  
24 To the best of our knowledge almost all the major Integrated Assessment Models fall into this category with the exception 
of Stern (2006) and Nordhaus (2008, Ch. 7).    17 
wealth. This follows from the fact that  var( ) 0 T = impliescov( , ) 0 W T = . Hence, by (2.13) we 
have 0 T φ = .   18   19 
4  The sign of the risk premium with respect to temperature 
The sign of the risk premium with respect to temperature,  T φ , is determined by the sign of the 
partial derivative of (optimal) consumption with respect to temperature, the cross-derivative of 
the utility function and the covariance between wealth and temperature. In this section, we 
discuss possible restrictions on the sign of these determinants and interpret these in terms of 
literature on (the economics of) climate change.  
 
We start with the case where both the cross-derivative of the utility function, CT U , and the 
covariance between wealth and temperature,cov( , ) W T , are zero. This case is of considerable 
interest as it includes as a special case the type of climate change model used in the literature 
(Stern (2007), Nordhaus (2008)).
25 The risk premium with respect to temperature is given by 
ˆ var( ) T CC C T U U C T φ = −  implying that its sign is fully determined by the sign of the partial 
derivative of optimal consumption with respect to temperature.
26 What do we know about the 
change in consumption as a result of a change in temperature when the level of wealth constant? 
Suppose for the moment that the change in temperature will result in a decrease in future wealth 
and will leave the variance of the stochastic processes of wealth and temperature unchanged. 
The decrease of future wealth implies a rise of the marginal value of future wealth. Hence, the 
consumer would like to increase future wealth at the expense of current wealth by reducing 
current consumption. Under the conditions specified, both the sign of the partial derivate of 
consumption with respect to temperature and the risk premium with respect to temperature will 
be negative. Climate investments are discounted at a rate smaller than non-climate investments. 
When the increase in temperature affects the (co)variance of the stochastic processes of either 
wealth or temperature or both, additional effects may come into play. For example, an 
exogenous increase in uncertainty increases the prudent consumers’ willingness to save, which 
is reflected in higher risk free rate (Leland (1968)). The increased willingness to save decreases 
current consumption, i.e. the partial derivative of uncertainty on consumption is negative for a 
prudent consumer. In the context of a stochastic dynamic model of optimal consumption Gollier 
(2002a, 2002b, 2007) shows that the properties of the term structure of the risk free rate depend 
on both the properties of the utility function and the properties of the stochastic process of 
wealth.  In the special case where the growth of the economy follows a stationary random 
process and the representative agent has a constant relative risk aversion, the wealth and 
uncertainty effect exactly compensate each other.
27  
 
25 Both Nordhaus (2008) and Stern (2007) use  ( , ) ( ) U C T U C = and (implicitly) assume cov( , ) 0 W T = . 
26 There exists a sizeable literature on the Environmental Kuznetz Curve by now. Recent theoretical work includes papers by 
Andreoni and Levinson (2001) and Johansson and Kriström (2007). Note, however, that his literature is concerned with the 
sign of the total derivative of consumption with respect to the flow pollution instead of the partial derivative of consumption 
with respect to temperature (which is a stock variable). 
27 We are not aware of any studies that have empirically tried to estimate the partial effect of temperature on consumption. A 
number of studies have tried to estimate the partial effect of temperature on GDP though (see f,e. Horowitz (2006) and Dell 
et. al. (2008)), but we are interested the partial effect on temperature on consumption.   20 
In case consumption and temperature are not independent goods in consumption,  0 CT U ≠ , the 
risk premium with respect to temperature is given by  ˆ ( ) var( ) T CC T CT C U C U U T φ = − + . 
Inspection shows that the effect of the partial derivative is reinforced by cross derivative if their 
signs are opposite. For example, in case  ˆ 0 T C < and  0 CT U > the risk premium with respect to 
temperature is unambiguously negative.  What do we know about the sign of this cross-
derivative? Heal (2008) observes that this “is not an issue that has been discussed in the 
literature, as we almost always work with one-good models.” Subsequently, he argues that for 
‘low temperatures’, temperature and consumption are likely to be complements, i.e. 0 CT U > , 
whereas for ‘high temperatures’ they are likely to be substitutes, i.e.  0 CT U < .
28 The general 
idea here is that there is a minimum level of ecosystem services needed for survival, i.e. the 
provision of water, air and basic foodstuffs. For high temperatures, the ecosystem approaches 
its limits and there is no substitutability between the ecosystem and produced consumption 
goods. As temperature and the quality of the ecosystem are negatively related, we have that 
produced consumption and temperature must be substitutes. For low temperatures, we will still 
have substitutability between consumption and the ecosystem implying that consumption and 
temperature must be complements. In terms of the risk premium with respect to temperature, 
this means that as long as consumption and temperature are complements, the risk premium will 
decrease, thus making abatement and mitigation more attractive. This case is relevant as long as 
temperature remains ‘low’. When the limits of the ecosystem are approached, the risk premium 
will increase thereby making abatement and mitigation less attractive. This case is relevant 
when temperature is ‘high’, i.e. when the effects of climate change are likely to be severe. 
 
If the stochastic processes of wealth and temperature are dependent, the risk premium of 
temperature is given by  ˆ ˆ ( ) var( ) cov( , ) T CC T CT C CC C W U C U U T U U C W T φ = − + − .   From the 
first order condition for consumption, we can derive that  ˆ 0 W C > . Hence, the sign of the 
additional term introduced by the dependency of the stochastic processes of wealth and 
temperature will be equal to the sign of the covariance between wealth and temperature. This 
covariance captures the instantaneous movement between these state variables. In order to 
understand the type of effects captured by this covariance rewrite (2.3) and (2.6) as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ))
W t t W t a W t C t W t a G w
T t t T t T t aW t t s w
α
θ γ
′ ′ +∆ = + − ∆ + ∆
′ ′ +∆ = + ∆ + ∆
  (4.1) 
For small  t ∆ we have that  ( ) W t t +∆ is equal to  ( ) W t plus the expected change is the period 
( , ) t t t +∆ plus the unexpected change at timet t +∆ . Notice that during the time period 
 
28 Heal develops his argument in terms of consumption and environmental quality. As environmental quality and temperature 
are negatively related, his argument is easily restated in terms of consumption and temperature. Hence, when consumption 
and environmental quality are substitutes, consumption and temperature are complements are vice versa.    21 
( , ) t t t +∆ both  ( ) W t and  ( ) T t are kept constant. Hence, any effect from temperature on wealth 
(and vice versa) may not be caused by a change in temperature (wealth). For in that case, it 
would be captured by their respective drifts. 
 
Under what circumstances may we expect the covariance between wealth and temperature to be 
different from zero? First of all, emissions at time t  may be related to the actual instead the 
expected rate of return. In that case unexpected changes in wealth will be positively correlated 
with unexpected changes in temperature as higher (lower) wealth leads to higher (lower) 
emissions. As a result the covariance between wealth and temperature would be positive. 
Second, unexpected changes in temperature at timet  may lead to (unexpected) changes in 
wealth in timet . As these changes must be contemporaneous, the effect on wealth may not 
operate through a change in temperature. This excludes most of the so-called feedback effects 
mentioned in the literature on climate change as these either increase (positive feedbacks) or 
decrease (negative feedbacks) temperature. For example, the unexpected release of methane 
from sinks on land or the deep ocean is a positive feedback. Such an unexpected release would 
raise global temperatures and hence would decrease future wealth, but would not have a 
contemporaneous effect on wealth (methane in itself does not damage wealth). A possible 
exception is an unexpected change in water vapour. Unexpected increases in water vapour may 
be contemporaneously correlated with more intense precipitation, more severe storms and more 
intense flooding (Meehl and Stocker, (2007)). This would mean that the covariance between 
wealth and temperature is negative. We are unaware of any studies that have tried to estimate 
this instantaneous covariance. Hence, not only the sign but also the magnitude of the covariance 
between wealth and temperature is undetermined. Finally, notice that a non-zero covariance 
may be the result of an underlying third factor influencing both wealth and temperature 
simultaneously. Although we cannot rule out this possibility, we are unaware that such a third 
factor actually exists.   22   23 
5  Conclusion 
A general insight from the literature on cost-benefit analysis is that investments should be 
discounted at a rate that reflects their non-diversifiable risk in aggregate wealth. In this paper, 
we have generalized this insight to include non-diversifiable risk with respect to average global 
temperature. Using this result, we have shown that climate and non-climate investments will in 
general be discounted at a different rate. This allows us to substantiate Weitzman´s argument 
that climate investments may indeed be discounted at a lower rate compared to non-climate 
investments. Our analysis shows that this is more likely when (i) the partial derivative of 
optimal consumption with respect to temperature is smaller than zero; (ii) consumption and 
temperature are complements in consumption; and (iii) the covariance of wealth and 
temperature is negative. We have discussed when these conditions are likely to be met, but 
noted that there has been little discussion on these topics in the literature. Weitzman (2007) 
further suggested that spending more money to combat climate change may be more about 
insurance than about consumption smoothing. We note that – given a suitably chosen process 
for average global temperature – our model encompasses the possibility that climate change 
might be predominantly about small risk and large losses. 
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Appendix A 
Recognizing that the value of a contingent claim is a function of the state variables W and T , 
we get, applying Ito’s Lemma: 
[ ]
2 2 1
2 ( , ) ( ) 2 ( )( ) ( ) t W T WW WT TT dF W T Fdt F dW F dT F dW F dW dT F dT   = + + + + +    
Using equations (2.3) and (2.6) to substitute out dW  and dT  we get after some 
rearrangements: 
 






ˆ ˆ ( ( 2 ) 2 ( ) )
t W T
WW WT TT
F F F a W b W C F
F W a GG a a Ghb b h h F W a G bh s F s s
β ζ α β θ ′ − = + + − + +




W W T Fh F Wa G F bh F s ′ ′ ′ ′ = + +    30 
Appendix B 
For convenience, we repeat equation (2.9) containing the first order conditions:  
( ) ( )











a W T WW WT
a
b W WW WT
U J
C
r WJ WJ GG a Ghb W J GsWJ
a
r WJ h G a h hb W J h sWJ
ψ
ψ





′ = − + + + + ≤
′ =
′ ′ ′ ′ = − + + + =
  (B.1) 
We first turn to the proof for the expression of the equilibrium interest rate given in (2.10). 
From (B.1) we see that the equilibrium solution for  , a r and β  in terms of the (derivates of the) 
value function  J is partially separable. When  0 b = the third and the fourth first order condition 
determine a  and r . Given a and r , the fifth first order condition will determine β . Denote the 
equilibrium value of the control variables in (B.1) by  ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , , ) C a b . As in CIR (1985) the optimal 
value of the equilibrium interest rate can be determined by examining two related planning 
problems. The first planning problem has the same physical production opportunities and 
interaction between the economy and the environment, but has no borrowing, lending and 
contingent claims. The second planning problem is identical to the first planning problem with 
borrowing and lending allowed (but contingent claims not). 
 
Let a ɶ and C ɶ denotes the optimal physical investment and consumption strategy for the first 
planning problem and  J ɶ the corresponding indirect utility (or value) function. The portfolio 






a a a Da
a
a
φ ′ ′ +
′ =
≥
  (B.2) 
where  2 W T WT WJ WJ GsWJ φ α θ γ = + + ɶ ɶ ɶ  and 
2 1
2 WW D GG W J ′ = ɶ . Notice that solving (B.2) gives 
the third and fourth first order condition of (B.1) when there is no borrowing or lending, i.e. 
0 r = , and there are no contingent claims, i.e.  0 b = . As a ɶ is optimal, then by the Kuhn-Tucker 
theorem there exists a λ ɶ such that 
*1 2 0






′ − + =
ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ
  (B.3)   31 
Hereλ ɶ is the shadow price corresponding to the market clearing condition  1 1 a′ = . Now we turn 
to the second planning problem with borrowing and lending at r ɶ and indirect utility at  J ɶ ɶ . 
Comparing the first and the second planning problem shows that if  J J = ɶ ɶ ɶ and  W r WJ λ = ɶ ɶ ɶ , we 
have that ( , , ) r a C ɶ ɶ ɶ is the equilibrium for the second planning problem. The equilibrium interest 
rate in this economy is proportional to the shadow price, λ ɶ , in the first planning problem. 
Hence, in equilibrium we will have  ˆ C C = ɶ , ˆ a a = ɶ ,r r = ɶ and  J J J = = ɶ ɶ ɶ . This gives the 




ˆ ˆ ( 2 )
( , , )
var( ) cov( , ) ˆ ( )




a WJ WJ GsWJ GG aW J
r W T t
WJ WJ
J J J W W T
a
J J W J W
α θ γ λ
α θ γ
′ ′ + + +
= =
    − −     ′ = + − −        
       
ɶ
  (B.4) 
The last step follows directly by substituting in the expressions for the variance of wealth and 
the covariance between wealth and temperature evaluated at the optimal values for a and b . 
These definitions follow directly from (2.3) and (2.6). 
 
Subsequently, we turn to the proof for the expression of the expected rate of return on any 
contingent claim (2.11) and the associated risk premia (2.12). Rearranging the fifth first order 
condition of (B.1) and multiplying by F we get:  






W M W T
W W
W W T T
J WJ
F rF Fh s Fh G a
J J
J WJ





′ ′ ′ = − −
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ = − + − +
= + +
  (B.5) 
Here, we have used the expression for  Fh′  (evaluated at  0 b = ) that was derived in Appendix 
A for the second equality and have rearranged terms on  W F  and  T F to derive the third equality. 
The risk premia  W ϕ  and  T ϕ have been implicitly defined and are equal to 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ












ϕ ′ ′ ′ = − −
   
= − + −    
   
  (B.6)   32 
ˆ












ϕ ′ ′ ′ = − −
   
= − + −    
   
  (B.7) 
Finally, the proof of equation (2.13) is given by 
2
( )/
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
cov( , )/
W W T T
WW W WT W WT WW T T
W W W W
W W
r F F F
J F J F J J F F
W a GGa Wa Gs s s Wa Gs
J F J F J F J F
F J FJ
β ϕ ϕ − = +
′ ′ ′ ′ = − − − −
= −
 
The first equality follows directly from (B.5). The second from substituting in (B.6) and (B.7) 
as well as the expressions for  var( ) W , var( ) T and cov( , ) W T . Finally, the third equality follows 
from applying Ito’s Lemma to write out  ( , ) W dJ W T explicitly and using the result of Appendix 
A to determine cov( , ) W F J . This completes the proof.   33 
Appendix C 
We want to show that the equilibrium interest rate is equal to minus the expected rate of change 
in the marginal utility of wealth which in turn is equal to the expected social rate of return on 
wealth plus the covariance of the rate of return on wealth with the rate of change in the marginal 
utility of wealth. First, we develop an expression for the expected rate of change in the marginal 





ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ( )
ˆ ˆ ) ( ) ( )
W W WW WT WWW
WWT WTT WW WT
dJ J a W C J J a GG aW J
a GWsJ s sJ dt a GWJ J s dw t
δ α θ ′ ′ ′ = − + − + + +
′ ′ ′ ′ + + +
.  (C.1) 
Hence, the drift term in (C.1) is equal to the expected rate of change in the marginal utility of 
wealth. Second, we prove that the equilibrium interest rate equals minus the expected rate of 






var( ) cov( , ) ˆ ( , , ) ( )







MT WTT W W
w
J J J W W T
r W T t a
J J W J W
W J W T J a W C J
E dJ





    − −     ′ = + − −        
       
′ = + + − +
′ + + = −
 (C.2) 
The second equality follows from differentiating the Bellman equation (2.8) with respect to 
W recognizing that both C and a are functions of W and using the first order conditions on 
C and a . The third equality follows from (C.1). 
 
Finally, we show that the equilibrium interest rate is equal to the expected social rate of return 
plus the covariance of the rate of return on wealth with the rate of change in the marginal utility 





var( ) cov( , ) ˆ ( , , ) ( )










J J J W W T
r W T t a
J J W J W
J








    − −     ′ = + − −        
       
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ = + − +
′ = + +
 (C.3) 
where the third equality follows from (C.1) and (2.6).   34 
Appendix D 
We want to show that the expression in (2.10) simplifies to the extended Ramsey equation if 






var( ) cov( , ) ˆ ( , , ) ( )





WT WTT W W
J J J W W T
r W T t a
J J W J W
W J W T J a W C J




    − −     ′ = + − −        
       
′ = + + − +
′ + +
  (D.1) 
Differentiation of  W C J U = with respect to W and T gives  ˆ
WW CC W J U C =  and  ˆ
WT CC T J U C = . 
Differentiating these expression again with respect to W and T gives 
2 ˆ ˆ
WWW CCC W CC WW J U C U C = + ,   ˆ ˆ ˆ
WWT CCC W T CC WT J U C C U C = +  and 
2 ˆ ˆ
WTT CCC T CC TT J U C U C = + . 
Substituting these expressions into (D.1) and rearranging terms gives: 
1 1
2 2
2 2 1 1
2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , , ) (( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ var( ) cov( , ) var( ) )






W W T T
CC
U
r W T t a W C C C
U
W C W T C T C
U




′ = + − − +  
 
+ + + +
 
− + +  
 
  (D.2) 









ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( ) var( )
ˆ ˆ cov( , ) var( )




dC W T C a W C C C W
C W T C T dt
C a GW C s dw t
α θ ′ = − + +
+ +
′ ′ + +
  (D.3) 
Using this to rewrite (D.3) gives the desired result: 
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) { ( )} ( ) ( )var( ( ))
2
r C E g C P C C g C δ η η = + − ,  (C.4) 
where  ( ) η • and  ( ) P • are respectively the coefficient of relative risk aversion and relative 
prudence. Equation (C.4) is the extended Ramsey equation. In the absence of uncertainty 
ˆ var( ( )) 0 g C =  and (C.4) becomes the Ramsey equation.    35 
Appendix E 
Using  W C J U = , we obtain by differentiation ˆ
WW CC W J U C =  and  ˆ
WT CC T CT J U C U = + . 
Here, ˆ
W C and  ˆ
T C denote the partial derivative of optimal consumption with respect to wealth 
and temperature respectively. Substituting these expressions into (2.12) and (2.13) we get: 
( ) ˆ ˆ var( ) cov( , ) cov( , ) CC W T CT
W
C C
U C W C W T U W T
U U
ϕ
  − +   −   = +       
  (E.1) 
( ) ˆ ˆ cov( , ) var( ) var( ) CC W T CT
T
C C
U C W T C T U T
U U
ϕ
  − +   −   = +       
  (E.2) 
Second, we rewrite (2.15) and (2.16) by applying Ito’s Lemma to ( , ) dC W T . From appendix D 








ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( ) var( )
ˆ ˆ cov( , ) var( )




dC W T C a W C C C W
C W T C T dt
C a GW C s dw t
α θ ′ = − + +
+ +
′ ′ + +
  (E.3) 
Together with (2.3) and (2.6) this gives: 
2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ cov( , ) var( ) cov( , )
ˆ ˆ cov( , ) cov( , ) var( )
W T W T
W T W T
C W C a GGaW C a GsW C W C W T
C T C a GsW C s s C W T C T
′ ′ = + = +
′ ′ = + = +
  (E.4) 





   36 
 